Thursday, May 27, 2004

Sarin Part 10

Okay. The presence of Sarin in the suspected 155mm shell used in an improvised explosive device(IED) has been confirmed.

According to this VOA report, it has been further confirmed that the munition was made prior to the 1991 Gulf War.

I wasn't prepared for this to be revealed, as most of my line of unanswered questions were contingent upon this data being withheld.

My line of questions I feel that need to be answered are now much fewer in number.

What we do know is that it is highly likely that Iraq under Hussein produced the munition with a wink and a nod from Washington under the guise of insecticide production materials which are a series of small steps away from the the production of Sarin(GB), Tabun(GA) and Soman(GD). Hence the term 'dual use technology' often bandied about by the media.

Now that we have the time of production of the binary device, it leaves very few unanswered questions.

We have no independent, seriously considered allegations that Saddam was able to restart his chem./bio./nuclear programs after the 1991 Gulf War. A decade plus of sanctions along with American and British enforced no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq, along with verifed UNMOVIC destructions of both facilities and munitions served to likely nullify any attempts by Saddam to restart any of Iraq's pre-1991 Gulf War illicit weapons programs. Therefore, a properly skeptical person would have serious doubts that new materials have been produced.

From the FAS:
Production of the nerve gases tabun (GA) and sarin (GB) started in 1984 and the method of production changed over time in order to resolve stabilization problems. Iraq's latest declarations have reduced the stated amount of tabun produced from 250 tons to 210 tons and of sarin produced from 812 tons to 790 tons.

The tabun produced was poor, being of a maximum purity of 60 per cent. As a result, the agent did not store well and could only be stored for a limited period. Furthermore, Iraq experienced problems in the production of tabun owing to salt blockages forming in pipes during synthesis. Because of these problems, Iraq refocused its nerve agent research, development and production efforts on sarin (GB/GF).

The sarin produced was also of poor quality (maximum purity of 60 per cent when solvent is taken into account) and so too could only be stored for short periods. In order to overcome this problem, Iraq resorted to a binary approach to weaponization: the precursor chemicals for sarin (DF 2/ and the alcohols cyclohexanol and isopropanol) were stored separately for mixing in the munitions immediately prior to use to produce a mixture of two G-series nerve agents, GB and GF. Given that the locally manufactured DF had a purity of more than 95 per cent and the alcohols were imported and of 100 per cent purity, this process could be expected to yield relatively pure sarin.

Over the period from June 1992 to June 1994, the Commission's Chemical Destruction Group destroyed 30 tons of tabun, 70 tons of sarin and 600 tons of mustard agent, stored in bulk and in munitions.
My only question is this: How much of the produced material remains?

Since the numbers aren't in total agreement, this remains an unknown.

The most plausible explanation given thus far seems to be Scott Ritter's. He has stated he believes that the shell was a 'dud,' and almost certainly not part of a chemical weapons cache.

The very subdued responses by the Pentagon and Bush Administration officials would seem to lend credence to this view.

Sorry Faux News, and those still clinging to their pre-war dissonant fantasies. It now appears that this is an anomaly, not part of a much larger illicit cache.

I will maintain this most likely of positions until it can be shown otherwise.

No comments :